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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
DAVID J. GRIFFITHS 
and JACK I. DEAL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
16195 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged with and convicted of 
theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, in the Sixth Circuit 
Court, Tooele County, State of Utah. They were also 
charged by Information and convicted of burglary, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202(1) 
(1953), as amended, in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Tooele County, State of Utah. Prior to the 
burglary trial, appellants entered a plea of once in 
jeopardy, which was denied. It is from the burglary 
conviction that appellants appeal. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were charged on October 11, 1978, 
in the Sixth Circuit Court, Tooele County, State of 
Utah, with theft, a class B misdemeanor in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953), as amended; and 
burglary, a third degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1953), as amended. They were 
subsequently convicted on October 20, 1978, of the 
class B misdemeanors in the Sixth Circuit Court. On 
that same day, probable cause was found and the 
appellants were bound over to the Third Judicial 
District Court for trial on the burglary charges. 
On October 23, 1978, an Information charging the 
appellants with the aforesaid burglary was filed by 
the Tooele County Attorney. Not guilty pleas were 
entered and a jury trial set for Tuesday, November 21, 
1978. 
On November 13, 1978, appellants' motion 
to withdraw their not guilty plea and enter a plea 
of once in jeopardy was granted. On November 16, 
1978, a hearing on the once in jeopardy plea was 
conducted by the district court and said plea was 
-2-
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denied. A subsequent motion by appellants to vacate 
the trial setting was denied. A further written motion 
to vacate the trial setting was filed by appellants 
the day before trial. This too was denied. 
On November 21, 1978, appellants were tried 
on the burglary charge by a jury and found guilty as 
charged in the Information. 
Appellants were sentenced on the burglary 
charge to an indeterminate term of zero to five years 
in the Utah State Prison. A stay of execution was 
issued pending an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Appellant Griffiths was sentenced on the 
class B misdemeanor to pay a fine of $250 and serve 
60 days in Tooele County Jail. The jail sentence was 
stayed and appellant was placed on probation for a 
period of six months. 
Appellant Deal was sentenced on the class B 
misdemeanor to serve 120 days in the Tooele County Jail. 
60 days of the jail sentence was stayed and the appellant 
placed on probation with the Adult Probation and Parole 
for a period of six months to serve 60 days in the Tooele 
County Jail. 
-3-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment 
of the district court below convicting appellants of 
burglary. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of October 10, 1978, at 
approximAtely 10:25 p.m., the dispatcher in the Tooele 
City Police Department received a call informing her 
that the burglar alarm at the Cottage Market, a "7-11 
type store,• was ringing (District Court Record 10). 
She immediately dispatched Deputy Douglas Broadway of 
the Tooele County Sheriff's Department to the scene 
(D.C.R. 11). Upon arriving at the Cottage Market at 
10:31 p.m., Deputy Broadway observed a Blue Datsun parked 
next to the market (D.C.R. 13). The vehicle was occupied 
by the appellants (D.C.R. 13), Jack Deal sitting behind 
the driver's wheel in the front seat, David Griffiths 
sitting on the passenger's side in the front (D.C.R. 15). 
The motor of the vehicle was running (D.C.R. 18). The 
appellants were i~ediately ordered out of the vehicle 
and placed on the ground in the parking lot (D.C.R. 14, 
15). At this time Officer Morgan of the Tooele Police 
Department arrived with his dog, and along with Deputy 
Broadway, ascertained that a third person was still 
inside the Cottage Market (D.C.R. 15, 16). This third 
-4-
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person, Scott Byrd, was ordered out of the Cottage Market 
by Deputy Broadway (D.C.R. 16). Byrd exited through a 
window which he later admitted breaking prior to his 
entry (D.C.R. 17,33). The three men were placed under 
arrest, handcuffed, and transported to Tooele (D.C.R. 18). 
Deputy Broadway then discovered on the ground 
between the building and the Datson several items of 
jewelry, rings, a small screwdriver set, and a can of 
beer (D.C.R. 18). Also found in the Datsun were several 
cartons of cigarettes and a large quantity of beer 
(D.C.R. 18, 19). The items were identified by Mary 
Norris, Manager of the Cottage Market, as items carried 
by the store in inventory. Such items were found to be 
missing from the Cottage Market immediately subsequent 
to the night of October 10, 1978 (D.C.R. 24,26,27). 
At trial, testimony by Scott Byrd revealed 
that Jack Deal, one of the appellants, received the 
cigarettes and beer taken from the store by Byrd and 
placed them in the Datsun (D.C.R. 37). Appellant 
Griffiths was present while this transaction was 
occurring. 
-5-
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Testimony by Byrd also revealed that earlier 
in the evening of October 10, 1978, prior to the 
incident when the arrests were made, all three men had 
driven to the Cottage Market, where Byrd broke into the 
building through a window (D.C.R. 37). At that time, 
Deal and Griffiths were allegedly sleeping in the 
backseat of the Datsun (D.C.R. 37). The burglar alarm 
apparently went off while Byrd was inside, Deal drove the 
car around the building and picked Byrd up in the Datsun, 
and all three sped off towards Salt Lake City (D.C.R. 37). 
A few minutes later, Byrd persuaded appellant 
Deal, who was driving, to turn the vehicle around and 
return to the Cottage Market (D.C.R. 37), at which time 
the second entry into the Cottage Market was made. Byrd 
initially alleged that he told Deal and Griffiths that 
he wanted to return to the Cottage Market to retrieve 
a coat he had left behind. Byrd's testimony, however, 
revealed that he did not have a coat on that occasion, nor 
did Griffiths or Deal (D.C.R. 38). 
Appellants were subsequently convicted of theft, 
a class B misdemeanor, in the circuit court, and burglary, 
a third degree felony, in the district court. The trial 
in the district court was before a jury, with the 
-6-
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Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding. Pleas of 
once in jeopardy were made following the theft convic-
tion in the circuit court prior to preliminary hearing 
on the felony charge, and again prior to the actual trial 
in district court. Said pleas were denied each time 
(Circuit Court Record 67-72: District Court Record, 
Transcripts of Proceedings of November 16, 1978, 1-17). 
Following denial of the once in jeopardy pleas, appellants 
filed a motion to vacate the trial setting for the purpose 
of filing a writ of prohibition (D.C.R. 29). Such motion 
was filed the day before trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NEITHER THE DISTRICT COURT NOR THE 
CIRCUIT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE BURGLARY 
CHARGE ON THE GROUNDS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
Following their conviction for theft in the 
circuit court, appellants moved the circuit court to 
dis~iss the preliminary hearing on their burglary charge 
on the grounds of once in jeopardy. This motion was 
denied (Circuit Court Transcript, 67-72). Following 
their arraignment in district court on the same charge 
and prior to the jury trial, appellant's again moved for 
dismissal of the third degree felony charge of burglary 
on the grounds of once in jeopardy pursuant to Utah Code 
-7-
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Ann. S 76-1-402(2) (1953), as amended. This too was 
denied (District Court Record, Transcript of Proceedings 
November 16, 1978, 1-17). 
Appellants now file this appeal and contend 
that the district court was barred from trying them 
on the third degree felony charge on the grounds of 
once in jeopardy. The basis for their argument is 
centered around Utah Code Ann. S 77-21-31(1) (1953), as 
amended, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(2) (1953), as 
amended, which according to appellants, give the district 
court jurisdiction on the facts of this case to initially 
try both the class B misdemeanor and third degree felony. 
Since the appellants were tried and convicted on the class 
B misdemeanor in circuit court, their argument is that 
the statutory provisions of Section 76-1-402(2) regarding 
double jeopardy apply (since both offenses should allegedly 
have been tried in the district court), thereby precluding 
trial on the third degree felony in the district court. 
Respondent submits that appellants' argument 
has previously been presented to the Utah Supreme Court 
and rejected, and that Section 77-21-31(1) is a procedural 
statute, not intended, when read in conjunction with Sectio~ 
76-1-402(2), to allow the district court to initially 
try class B misde~eanors. 
-8-
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A. 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
AT BAR COME WITHIN THE BOUNDS 
AND LEGAL REASONING SET FORTH 
BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN 
STATE V. COOLEY, THEREBY 
PRECLUDING TRIAL OF A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY AND A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR INITIALLY IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
Appellant argues that the facts in the case 
of State v. Cooley, 575 P.2d 693 (Utah 1978), are 
distinguishable from those in the present case, thereby 
precluding the Cooley case from being within the ambit 
of Section 77-21-31(1). Respondent submits that the 
facts in both the Cooley case and the case at bar are 
extremely similar and that the law set forth in Cooley 
is applicable to the facts of the present case. Further-
more, Section 77-21-31(1) is a procedural statute dealing 
with forms of pleading, not with jurisdiction of offenses, 
and for this reason has no bearing on the Cooley case or 
the case at hand. 1 
In State v. Cooley, supra, the appellant was 
arrested and given two citations. One was for failing 
1 Appellant seemingly agrees with respondent that the 
facts of the Cooley case are not governed by Section 
77-21-31(1), but for different reasons. Appellant 
contends that the offenses in Cooley, though con-
stituting a single criminal episode, were " ••• not 
of the sa~e or sinilar character, ..• are not based 
on the sa~e act or transaction or two or more acts or 
transactions connected together ... [and] do not 
constitJtc pLirts of a common sche~e." Appellants' 
bric:, p. 13. 
-9-
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to stop his motor vehicle at the command of a police 
officer, an indictable misdemeanor; the other was 
for two offenses, viz: (a) driving with an improper 
license and (b) having no tail light on a boat trailer 
attached to the motor vehicle, both class B misdemea~~rs. 
The defendant pleaded guilty before a Justice 
of the Peace to the charges of no driver's license and 
no tail light and paid the fines. When arraigned on the 
charge of failing to stop at the command of a police 
officer, he pleaded once in jeopardy pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-1-402(2) (1953), as amended. That 
section provides: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in 
a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal 
episode. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish 
separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise 
orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials 
for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within 
the jurisdiction of a single 
court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to 
the prosecuting attorney at the time 
the defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
Appellant contended in Cooley that since the 
citations were issued at the same time (conduct establishi~= 
-10-
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separate offenses under a single criminal episode), he 
could not be charged with the indictable misdemeanor of 
failure to stop his motor vehicle at the command of a 
police officer, since the prosecuting attorney knew of 
all the charges when they were made before the Justice 
of the Peace Court. The district court argued and 
dismissed the information. The State appealed pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 (1) (1953), and the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, remanding the case back to the 
district court for trial on the merits. 
In its opinion, the Court observed that the 
two charges before the Justice of the Peace were 
class B misdemeanors, triable before the Justice of the 
Peace on a complaint, 2 while the charge of failing to 
stop his vehicle at the command of a police officer was 
an indictable misdemeanor triable only on information or 
indictment in the district court. 3 
2 The Court cited Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 (1943). 
3 In support of this proposition, the Court cited Article 
VII, § 7 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. S 
77-16-1 (1953), as amended, which respectively were cited 
as follows: "'The District Court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not 
excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law.'" 
[Emphasis added.) The Legislature did provide by law the 
following: "All public offenses triable in the district 
courts, except cases appealed from justices' and city courts, 
must be prosecuted by information or indictment .•.• " 
-11-
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The Court thus concluded that the two different 
classifications of misdemeanors (indictable and class B) 
could not be tried together since statutory law proscribed 
that class B misdemeanors be tried in the Justice of the 
Peace courts while indictable offenses be tried in the 
district courts: 
It thus is evident that the 
provisions of u.c.A., 1953, 76-1-402 
(2) (a) relating to a single criminal 
episode does not apply for the reason 
that the crime of failinf to stop a 
vehicle at the command o a police 
officer cannot be tried in the same 
court where the other two cr~mes 
must be tr~ed. 
575 P.2d at 694 (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, appellants allege that 
the facts in the Cooley case are distinguishable from 
those in the present case because the Cooley facts do 
not come within the purview of Section 77-21-31(1), 
whereas the instant facts do. Section 77-21-31(1) reads: 
Two or more offenses may be charged 
in the same indictment or information in 
a separate count for each offense if the 
offenses charged, whether felonies or 
misdemeanors or both, are of the same 
or similar character or are based on the 
same act or transaction or on two or more 
acts or transactions connected together 
or constituting parts of a common scheme 
or plan. 
Appellants say in their argument that the offenses 
involved in Coolev, i.e., failing to stop a motor 
-12-
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vehicle at the command of a police officer, driving 
with an improper license, and having no tail light 
on a boat trailer attached to a motor vehicle, though 
constituting a single criminal episode, are •. 
~ of the same or similar character • • • are not 
based on the same act or transaction or two or more 
acts or transactions connected together [and] 
do~ constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.• 
See Appellant's Brief, p. 13. Thus, appellants imply 
that the Utah Supreme Court decided the Cooley case as 
it did because the offenses involved did not meet the 
criteria of Section 77-21-31(1). 
Respondent strongly submits otherwise. The 
Court specifically declared the reason that the case 
was decided as it was, that being that all the crimes 
involved could not by statute have been tried in the 
same court (see 575 P.2d at 694), thus the inapplicability 
of Section 76-1-402(2) (a). No mention was made by the 
Court of Section 77-21-31(1), not because, as appellants 
say, the criteria of Section 77-21-31(1) were not met 
by the facts, but because Section 77-21-31(1), being a 
procedural statute, had no bearing whatsoever on the 
question of jurisdiction of the offenses involved. 
-13-
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Respondent further submits that the facts 
of the present case fall squarely within the purview of 
Cooley. In both cases class B misdemeanors were tried 
in the Justice of the Peace court (circuit court in 
present case). In both cases indictable offenses 
were charged (indictable misdemeanor in Cooley: third 
degree felony in the present case). In both cases the 
offenses involved were separate offenses arising out of 
a single criminal episode. Thus, the reasoning and 
result in Cooley should be applied in the present case, 
thereby sustaining the position of this Court that class 
B misdemeanors pursuant to statutory law and case law, 
cannot be initially tried in the district courts. 
Finally, Section 77-21-31(1) has no applicability 
to the present case since both offenses cannot, pursuant 
to State v. Cooley, supra, and statutory law (see Point 
C, infra), be tried in the same court initially. 
B. 
THE CASE OF HAKKI V. 
FAUX PRECLUDES THE TRYING 
OF CLASS B MISDEMEANORS IN 
THE DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT 
INVOKING THE PROPER PROCEDURE. 
Appellants' claim that both the class B 
misdemeanor and the third degree felony should have 
been tried initially in the district court is expressly 
-14-
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rebuked in the case of Hakki v. Faux, 16 Utah 2d 132, 
396 P.2d 867 (1964), which was cited by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Cooley case. 
In Hakki, the plaintiff had been charged 
with a nonindictable misdemeanor in a complaint filed 
in the district court. The district judge thought he 
could try the case and in order to prevent his doing 
so, the defendant (plaintiff on appeal) brought a 
writ of prohibition against any further proceeding in 
the district court on the complaint filed therein. 
In granting the writ, the court held that the proper 
procedure to bring a nonindictable misdemeanor before 
the district court was not followed: 
Concluding, as we must, in the 
light of statutes and case authority 
that the proper procedure for invoking 
the original jurisdiction of the 
District Court has not been followed, 
the District Court was powerless to 
act in this matter. The Writ of 
Prohibition lies to prevent the judge 
from proceeding with the trial. It 
is so ordered. 
396 P.2d at 869. 
The Court in Hakki seemingly further said that 
where a nonindictable misdemeanor charge was originally 
filed in the District Court, and the proper procedure 
to invoke the jurisdiction was not followed and could 
not be followed, jurisdiction to initially try the case 
-15-
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waa thereby precluded. The Court followed the reasoning 
aet forth in State v. Telford, 93 Utah 228, 72 P.2d 
~26 (1937), and State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 
1034 (1941). 
In Telford, there was an improper transfer of 
a misdemeanor to the District Court. There, the Court 
said: 
The district court should not 
have proceeded with this case. A 
tribunal may have jurisdiction o? a 
sUbject matter but the ri~ht to 
proceed under that jurisd~ction 
may depend on a condition precedent. 
Put in another way, the court may 
have jurisdiction of a subject 
matter but its jurisdiction should 
be properly invoked. 
There are many cases where 
courts have jurisdiction of a subject 
matter but that jurisdiction must be 
invoked according to a certain 
procedure • • • in the case of 
misdemeanors, the jurisdiction of 
the district court can be invoked in 
two ways only: First, by appeal; . 
second, if it appears by the 
certificate that there is no justice 
of the peace in the county qualified 
to try the case ••• 
* * * 
The district court itself should 
refuse to proceed if the certificate 
shows it is not an appeal, or that it 
is not shown that there are no justices 
of the peace in the county qualified to 
try the case •.•• 
72 P.2d at 627-628 (emphasis added). 
-16-
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In the Johnson case, the defendant was initially 
charged with a misdemeanor in the district court. A question 
was presented as to whether the district court had jurisdic-
tion to initially try the case: 
This presents the question of the 
construction of Article VIII, Section 7 
of .the State Constitution, which as far 
as involved here reads: "The District 
court shall have oriainal jurisdiction in 
all matters civil an criminal, not 
excepted in this Constitution, and not 
prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction 
from all inferior courts and tribunals, 
and a supervisory control of the same 
n 
114 P.2d at 1036. 
The Court went on to answer its question as to 
the meaning of "original jurisdiction" as set forth in 
Article VIII, Section 7 of the State Constitution: 
Does this provision mean that any_ 
civil or criminal matter not expressly 
prohibited by law may be commenced, in the 
first instance, in the district court 
regardless of statutory provisions 
providing another forum where certain cases 
must be commenced and may them come to the 
district court by appeal? In other words 
what is the meaning of the term original 
jurisdiction? Does it refer to the locus 
or situs of the initial instigation of a 
legal controversy or does it refer to the 
nature of the adjudicative power of the 
tribunal? Does it refer to the tribunal 
where the processes invoking juridicial 
action must emanate or be filed in the 
first instance; or does it define the form 
and extent of the juridicial power? We 
have no hesitancy in saying it is the latter. 
114 P.2d at 1036. 
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A distinction between "original" and "appellate 
juriadiction• was made by this Court in the Johnson case. 
Following this excellent treatise and history on such a 
diatinction, the Court espoused its interpretation and 
meaning of Article VIII, S 7 of the State Constitution 
in light of the jurisdictional issue: 
* * * 
A power to constitute courts is a 
power to prescribe its powers and the 
mode of trial, and consequently if nothing 
is said in the Constitution to the con-
trary, the legislature would be at 
liberty to prescribe what cases should 
be tried therein. The specification of 
an obligation that all criminal cases 
may be tried in the District Court does not 
abridoe the power of the leoislature to 
orovide that some must be commenced and 
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·ust tried in another tribunal. The 
leg1slature may generally rrescr e 
the methods or means by wh ch the 
~urisdiction of the courts may be 
1nvoked in the absence of constitutional 
limitations. 
(Emphas1s added). 
* * * 
By giving the inferior courts 
jurisdiction of specific classes of 
cases the legislature did not limit 
the jurisdiction of the district courts, 
but conditions precedent are interposed 
to the exercise of such jurisdiction. 
They may ultimately have the question 
tried before them on appeal, and a 
decision by a district court in a case 
brought before it from a justice of the 
peace or city court is final ••• the 
higher court has the power to hear the 
matter in controversy but the inferior 
court is the proper one to just take 
cognizance of the matter. If, however, 
there is not a qualified inferior 
tribunal to hear the cause, upon proper 
showing of this fact the district court 
will exercise its inherent power and 
assume jurisdiction over the cause . . . 
(Emphasis added) . 
* * * 
Since the legislature has laid 
down a certain procedure for invoking 
the jurisdiction of the district courts 
this procedure must be followed. 
(Emphasis added). 
* * * 
While the District Court has 
general jurisdiction in all criminal 
matters, the proper procedure in mis-
demeanor cases as prescribed by statute 
is to commence the action in the city 
or justice's court ... 
114 P.2d at 1035, 1039, 1040, 1042 (emphasis added). 
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It is readily apparent that the Hakki courts based 
its decision to a large extent on the reasoning set forth 
in State v. Johnson, supra: 
• ••. The opinion very clearly 
develops the thesis that original 
jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution 
does not mean that an action must be 
originally brought in the court having 
original jurisdiction, nor that there is 
a right originally to initiate it in 
that court. The word "original" expresses 
an adjudicative power of the court to 
function originally in regard to the 
litigation, independently of another 
tribunal, as it could have done if 
originally brought in that court and 
not as a court reviewing the action of 
another tribunal. I think the distinction 
sound and the only one workable under 
the various provisions of our constitution. 
Hakki, supra, at 396 P.2d 869, quoting from Justice Wolfe's 
concurring opinion in State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d at 1043. 
Respondent thus submits that in the present case 
the District Court was powerless to try the class B 
misdemeanor initially because of the reasons set forth in 
Hakki, Johnson, and Telford cases. The jurisdiction of 
the District Court to try the class B misdemeanor could have 
been invoked in only one of two ways, neither way being 
appropriate under the facts of the instant case. The 
initial trial was properly held in the Circuit Court. 
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c. 
S 77-21-31(1), UTAH CODE ANN., 
1953, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT CONFER 
JURISDICTION ON THE DISTRICT COURTS 
TO INITIALLY TRY A CLASS B MIS-
DEMEANOR. 
Article VIII, S 7, of the Utah Constitution confers 
jurisdiction upon the District Courts to try all matters 
civil and criminal which are not excepted in the State 
Constitution and " •.• not prohibited by law: ••• • 
[Emphasis added] . The Utah Legislature has nprohibited by 
law" the trying of certain cases initially in the District 
Court through the enactment of various statutes. The 
Legislature has also proscribed the method by which a case 
is to be initially presented and brought before the District 
Court. Section 77-16-1, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, 
provides: 
All public offenses triable in the 
district courts, except cases appealed from 
justices and circuit courts, as well as 
class A misdemeanors triable in circuit 
courts, must be prosecuted by information 
or indictment, ... 
Thus, if an offense is triable in the district court, it must 
be brought by information or indictment, unless appealed 
from a circuit or justice court. In the instant case, the 
class B misdemeanor was not appealed from the circuit court, 
nor was it cresented by information of indictment, since 
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Section 78-5-4, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, gives the 
justice's courts jurisdiction to initially try all class 
B misdemeanors punishable by certain fines and imprisonment 
time: 
(1) Justice's courts have 
jurisdiction of the following public 
offenses committed within the re-
spective counties in which such 
courts are established: 
(a) All class B and class C 
misdemeanors punishable by a fine 
less than $300 or by imprisonment. 
not exceeding six months, or by both 
Section 77-57-2, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, makes it 
mandatory that all proceedings and actions before a justice's 
court for a misdemeanor be commenced by a complaint under 
oath. 4 Thus, statutory laws herein cited specifically give 
the circuit court judge in the present case the jurisdiction 
ancauthority to try the class B misdemeanor of theft. 5 
Respondent submits that § 77-21-31 was enacted as 
a procedural statute (it is located in the Rules of Pleading -
Forms of Information and Indictment Charter of Title 77 -
4 Section 78-4-16, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, gives 
the city courts the same powers and jurisdiction in all 
criminal actions as are or may be prescribed for justices 
of the peace. Section 78-4-16.5, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended, gives authority for a complaint to be commenced 
before a city court judge if such a complaint may be com-
menced before a Magistrate pursuant to § 77-57-2. 
5 Section 76-6-412(1) (d) makes theft under§ 76-6-404 a 
class B misdemeanor under the facts of the present case. 
-22-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Code of Civil Procedure), and was intended to be used~ 
jurisdiction or venue of offenses had already been established. 
For example, S 77-21-31(1) in conjunction with S 76-1-402(2), 
would be used to prevent the prosecution from putting a 
defendant through separate trials for several offenses (e.g., 
a second degree felony) , if the separate offenses were part 
of the same act or transaction, etc.~ part of the same 
criminal episode; and of course, very important, under the 
jurisdiction of a single court. 
Finally, respondent submits that S 76-1-402(2) 
is not applicable because of the aforestated reasons that the 
third degree felony and class B misdemeanor are not initially 
triable in the courts of the same jurisdiction. 
POINT II. 
BURGLARY AND LARCENY ARE TWO 
SEPAR~TE OFFENSES, AND AS SUCH, ARE 
SEPARATELY TRIABLE, EVEN THOUGH THEY 
ARE IN THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
Appellant, in Point II of his brief at pp. 14-15, 
concedes that burglary and theft in the instant case are 
two separate offenses. Respondent further adds that because 
of their jurisdictional problems which have heretofore been 
discussed in Point I., such offenses are also separately triable, 
though part of the same criminal episode. 
As authority for the proposition that the offense 
cf larceny and burglary are separate offenses, though part of 
~~c same cri~inal episode, resoondent refers the Court to 
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the ca•e of State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262 
(1962)1 Rogerson v.Harris,l78 P.2d 397 (1947). See also, 
State v. Thatcher, lOB Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945), which 
hold• that a prosecution for an "act or omission" made 
punishable by more than one statute did not bar a second 
prosecution unless the acts or omissions charged were, as 
a whole, the same: also, the fact that some of the acts or 
omissions charged in the first prosecution were also elements 
of the second offense was irrelevant. 
In Rogerson, the Court stated: 
In this case burglary and 
larceny arose out of the same total 
transaction but the proof of the 
burglary stopped when the proof of 
the larceny started. Entirely 
different facts constitute the dif-
ferent crimes of which the plaintiff 
was found guilty. The same facts 
therefore do not constitute the two 
crimes joined but different facts constitute 
the different crimes of which the plaintiff 
was found guilty. The same facts 
therefore do not constitute the two 
crimes joined but different facts con-
stitute different crimes. 
178 P.2d at 399. 
In the instant case, the acts of Scott Byrd were 
imputed to the appellants under S 76-2-202, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended, making them liable as principals, though 
they were accomplices. The appellants were present with 
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By_rd when he entered the Cottage Market the second time, 
they knew he was going to enter, and one of the appellants, 
Deal, drove Byrd to the situs. The purpose with which 
Byrd entered the store was a matter for jury determination. 
Apparently the jury was convinced that the requisite 
criminal intent for burglary was present. It shall be 
noted that the act of appellant Deal in "loading up• the 
stolen goods in the car is reflective of his intent, as is 
appe-::.lant Griffiths' acquiescence in being present and lending 
support, never trying to escape the situation before it was 
too late. Respondent thus submits that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the conviction, and no procedural 
errors affecting appellant's due process occurred. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DID NOT 
VIOLATE APPELLANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
Appellants argue that their due process rights 
were violated by the actions of Judge Baldwin at the district 
court hearing on the plea of once in jeo~ardy when he: 
(1) allegedly argued the prosecution's case; (2) allegedly 
misapplied the law to the facts of the instant case; ( 3) 
allegedly did not allow defense counsel to fully argue his 
case; ( 4) refused to vacate the trial setting in order that 
defense counsel might attempt to obtain a writ of prohibition. 
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Respondent submits that reason 2 above has been 
heretofore arqued in this brief, and is submitted as such. 
Aa to reasons 1 and 3, respondent submits the transcript 
as support of the argument that Judge Baldwin did not 
arque the case for the prosecution and did allow defense 
counsel time and opportunity to argue his case. 
Respondent calls the attention of the Court to 
the colloquy on page 2 of the November 16, 1978, transcript, 
whereby the County Attorney submitted its argument in op-
position to appellant's once in jeopardy pl~a in the Cooley 
case: 
The Court: State of Utah vs. David 
Griffith and Jack I. Deal. County Attorney 
submitted it on a case he said he gave 
to you, their position. 
Mr. Young: Yes, your Honor. If he 
is referring to the Cooley case, I 
have a copy of that. 
A thorough reading of the transcript reveals that Judge Baldwin 
was well versed on the applicable case and statutory law, 
and was merely pointing out to defense counsel such law 
and the reasons he felt he was obliged to follow such law, 
though he personally might have agreed with defense counsel's 
position. See November 16, 1978 transcript, pp. 10, 14, 16. 
Appellants have made no argument as to how their due process 
rights were affectPn and cite no case or statutory authority. 
-26-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
R~spondent thus submits that the allegations made aqainat 
Judge Baldwin are frivolous and merit no consideration 
from this Court. 
Respondent submits that Judqe Baldwin correctly 
applied the law in the State of Utah to the facta at the 
hearing on appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground& 
of once in jeopardy, on November 16, 1978. As such, 
respondent claims that there was no reason shown as to why 
a writ of prohibition pursuant to Rule 65B(b) (4) should 
issue, thus no reason to vacate the trial setting as requested 
by appellants. Aside and apart from that fact, however, 
respondent submits that any error found by this Court to 
have been committed by the District Court in refusing to 
vacate the trial setting was harmless, since appellants have 
an adequate remedy on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Charrigan v. Bowman, 40 Utah 91, 119 P. 1037 (1911); 
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580 (1925). Should 
this Court find that the District Court should not have 
tried the third degree felony, the case will be dismissed 
and no harm done, since the appellants have already suffered 
embarrassment through their convictions of theft in the 
circuit court. 
Finally, respondent submits that a writ of 
prohibition will issue to prevent an inferior court or 
tribunal from exercising jurisdiction with which it had not 
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been vested by law, or to arrest it from exercising want 
or excess of legal jurisdiction, but not to prevent or 
correct an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, which, if 
this Court finds for appellants, would be the case. Campbell 
v. Durand, 39 Utah 118, 115 P. 986 (1911). The District 
Court having jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, S 7 
of the State Constitution to try felonies, a writ of 
prohibition would not have been proper, and any error in 
exercising jurisdiction on a jeopardy matter could be argued 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Courts do not have jurisdiction 
to initially try class B misdemeanors. Such is by 
statute the jurisdictional duty of the city courts and 
justices of the peace courts. Felony cases must be tr~ed 
in the District Courts, thus th-ere is no possible way that 
S 77-21-31(1) could have been applicable in the present case 
because both cases could not have been initially tried in 
the same court. The Cooley and Hakki cases substantiate this 
point. Furthermore, § 76-1-402(2) is not applicable for 
the same reason, viz: lack of jurisdiction to try both 
offenses initially in the same court. 
Appellants were charged with separate offenses 
arising out of the same episode, which were separately 
triable. 
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Finally, no due process violations can be 
substantiated in the record at the District Court hearing 
on the jeopardy motion or at the trial itself. For these 
reasons, respondent requests that the District Court 
judgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submi~ted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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